The Puzzle of 11-M: Why Spain?

11 March, 2004: Thirteen blasts rock the Spanish world. In four coordinated attacks, terrorists blow backpacks containing explosives inside of Madrid's commuter trains, during the start of the early-morning rush hour. By day's end, 191 people are dead, and 2.050 injured.

Early in the aftermath, Prime Minister José María Aznar pins responsibility for the bombings on Basque separatist group ETA, a move that ultimately costs his party the next presidential election and draws fire as demonstrative of the ineptness of Aznar's administration.

Because the terrorists responsible weren't ETA. The terrorists responsible were Islamic, inspired by (though not necessarily all members of) al-Qaeda and similar fundamentalist cells. But why would Islamic fundamentalists attack Spain?

Most people you ask would say the attacks were due to Spain's involvement in the Second Gulf War, then blossoming as a full-blown insurgency. At the time, about 1.300 Spanish members of the Plus Ultra Brigade, an international conglomerate of 2.500 troops from Spain, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, had their boots on the ground in Iraq. But the role of the Spanish Army wasn't military, but humanitarian, spending most of its time disseminating aid to the surrounding population. With the exception of a few isolated skirmishes, the Brigade's guns remained silent, bound by severely restricting Rules of Engagement. So why, then, would al-Qaeda choose to strike at a country of no particular military importance in the war? What did they hope to achieve?

My theory is that the attack on Spain was symbolic, more psychological than tactical. Spain's involvement in the war was already limited and the Spanish population at best lukewarm in its support. It would not take much to prompt a withdrawal, which could then be seen as a victory. When Spain retracted its troops in the aftermath of the 11-M bombings, one must realize the important boon this must have been for al-Qaeda and the insurgency's recruiting: they had brought a nation to its knees and forced it to surrender before them. If they could do that to Spain, then they could do it to other countries, and maybe even the US. It was a proof of concept that the fight they were carrying out could be won: a morale booster and political statement.

Even now, the US is engaged in its own struggle about whether to withdraw from Iraq. In a sense, the jihadists are achieving the same end all over again. The tenacity of the insurgency and infighting in Iraq is creating political divisions and friction within the US government, friction that mirrors that within the Spanish government in 2004. When the next presidential election rolls around in 2008 and a new President is put in office, will the US find it time to give up on the fight as well?

ETArras no - Why Zapatero should give up negotiations with ETA for good

Early in the morning on the 30th of December, 2006, a dream died. As smoke billowed from the blast crater left behind by a car bomb at Madrid's Barajas International Airport, Prime Minister Zapatero's hope for a permanent end to the fighting between the separatist group ETA and the government went up with it. Or should have.

But the fact is, Zapatero seems to retain his dream for peace with the violent Basque separatists. Though peace talks with ETA were cut off in the aftermath of the car bombing, the first violent incident since a ceasefire was called on the 22nd of March earlier that year, police response was uncharacteristically sluggish. Zapatero distinctly expressed a desire to maintain a chance of negotiations with ETA by ordering the talks put "on hold" instead of fully cut off. The truth of the matter is that there should never have been any negotiations with ETA, and there should certainly be no doubt that resuming them is out of the question.

Though frequent protests demonstrate that Spaniards, Basques and non-Basques alike, desire peace and an end to the protracted war of attrition between ETA and the government. But negotiating with terrorists doesn't bring peace. The moment you begin to negotiate with terrorists and acknowledge their demands is the moment that their cause is affirmed. If they see that their methods bring results, then what is to stop them from demanding everything and anything they want on the threat of continued violence? If governments give in to terrorists, then every dissatisfied member of society will begin to set up their own terrorist group to get what they want. Negotiations don't bring peace: they just sow more terrorism, and the 30th of December was merely a reminder of this fact.

So what should be the government's response? As in any case involving terrorism, a lack of mercy for all who would take others' lives in pursuit of their mindless goal. Members of ETA should continue to be rounded up and arrested without exception, put behind bars where they can't work on gathering funds or wiring car bombs and put to trial to decide a just punishment for their offenses. Let the courts decide what their fate may be; it will certainly be fairer than ETA's way of doing business, which is merely to kill, almost blindly.

If there is anyone that the government should show love to, it is the Basque people, most of whom do not advocate separatism and should not be lumped under the category of etarras but instead given the benefit of the doubt. But never again should the government bow down to the separatists, because it is overwhelmingly clear what results "negotiation" brings.